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Abstract
A broad political economy literature explained the introduction and
expansion of pension systems, but the effects caused by the endogenous
reduction of fertility have been largely disregarded, as the fertility choice
is usually considered exogenous. This paper suggests a model that takes
into account this effects and analyzes the net effect of the breakdown of
family ties on the dimension of pension systems. The empirical analysis
support an inverted-U development pattern: a continuous and progres-
sive weakening of family ties, after inducing the introduction of pension
systems, tends to reduce, ceteris paribus, their political support.
JEL classification: H55; D72; O15; J13; J14
Keywords: Family economics; Fertility; Political sustainability; Social se-
curity; Voting
1 Introduction
In the last century, in most developed countries, the transition from a state
with low economic growth and a primarily rural economy to a state with fast
growth and industrial economy had some strong effects on the domestic economy
causing, on the one hand, a huge reduction of the fertility rate and, on the other
hand, the introduction and subsequent development of pension spending.
Among the factors that led to the decline of the fertility rate are: the in-
crease of the return on human capital, which induces the substitution of quantity
with quality of children (see Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Barro, 1988;
Barro and Becker, 1989); the agricultural and medical development, which re-
duced the mortality rate and its volatility, hence reducing the need for a high
number of children (see Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002); the change in family relations
(weakening of the family ties, reduction of the socioeconomic differences be-
tween men and women), which induced a reversal in the direction of the net
∗I thank Roberto Cellini and Alice Schoonbroodt for guidance and helpful comments. The
responsibility of any errors or shortcomings remains mine.
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wealth flows reducing the economic attractiveness of fertility (see Caldwell, 1976,
1978; Boldrin and Jones, 2002); some social policies (pensions, compulsory ed-
ucation, child labour regulation), usually accompanying the economic develop-
ment, which increased the fertility costs and decreased the fertility benefits (see
Leibenstein, 1957; Caldwell, 1976, 1978; Cigno and Rosati, 1992).
As regards the introduction and development of pension systems, a broad
literature has studied this phenomenon, developing models that explain why
they exist and have been continuously expanding during the 20th century. The
question that immediately arises is why these pension systems exist and why
their growth is supported by the voters: it needs to be noticed, in fact, that the
main purpose of pension systems is to transfer wealth from a majority of worker-
voters to a minority of pensioner-voters. Since the Seventies, numerous papers
have tried to answer this question, and some interesting reviews of the litera-
ture are offered by Breyer (1994), Galasso and Profeta (2002) and de Walque
(2005). Focusing the attention only on the voting models, which is the approach
used in the present paper, Galasso and Profeta (2002) identify five motives for
the introduction of pension system: dynamic inefficiency, limited time horizon,
crowding-out of the investment, intragenerational redistribution and optimal
social contract.
The first explanation for the political support to pension systems is given
by their economic attractiveness in the special case of dynamic inefficiency: if
the ratio between interest rate and growth rate, also called Aaron variable, is
less than one then the present value of the wealth of future generations does
not converge, therefore a pay-as-you-go pension system (and public debt) is
Pareto-efficient (see Samuelson, 1958; Diamond, 1965; Aaron, 1966).
Another explanation is given by the fact that the portion of pension contri-
butions already payed are considered a sunk-cost by the voters, hence if for the
median voter the present value of the benefits coming from the pension system
is higher than the portion of contributions yet to be paid then a majority of
voters will support the pension system; moreover the older is the median voter,
the higher will be the size of the system (see Browning, 1975).
The third explanation relates to the crowding-out effect of pension systems
(and public debt) on investment, which increases the return on capital hence
motivating interest-earners to support it (see Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989;
Cooley and Soares, 1999; Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000).
A typical characteristic of pension systems is that contributions are propor-
tional to income, whereas benefits are partially independent of it, suggesting us
another explanation for the political support for pension system: low-income
voters are favorable toward the introduction and development of pension sys-
tems (see Tabellini, 1991, 2000; Casamatta et al., 2000).
The last explanation comes from the hypothesis of ascendant altruism: in-
dividuals tend to “undersave” during youth in order to obtain a transfer during
old age from the young generation, therefore the introduction of social security
would be Pareto-efficient and supported even under unanimity rule (see Hansson
and Stuart, 1989; Veall, 1986).
These motives, however, do not explain the timing of the introduction of
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social security. In other words, they do not explain why pension system have
been implemented just at the same time as economic development. Several
reasons have been proposed as possible answers to this question, summarized
by Cutler and Johnson (2004) as follows: insurance against the risks of the
capitalist system (e.g., Great Depression and the 1935 U.S. Social Security
Act); political legitimacy of non-democratic governments (e.g., the German and
Argentinean social security systems introduced by Bismarck and Pero´n); the
Wagner’s law, which assumes social insurance as luxury good (e.g., U.K. and
Australia implemented social security when they were the richest countries in
the world, and it was financed by general revenue); the demographic hetero-
geneity, which may induce the implementation of income redistribution policies;
the Leviathan theory, which claims that the governments tend to expand their
range of action; the demonstration effect, which induces countries to copy their
neighbours’successful policies.
Caucutt et al. (2007) suggest the transition from a rural economy to an
urban one as a possible explanation for the development of pension systems.
They conclude that the faster technological progress of the city compared with
that of the farm and the increase of the life expectancy led to the urbanization,
because of the larger productivity of the urban economy, and the need for a
larger amount of savings. This transition caused the passage from a rural median
voter, who grounds his old-age economic security on the land rent and is not
interested in a pension system (even though it could be more profitable), to an
urban median voter, who has a flat (or even hump-shaped) age-earning profile,
therefore more favourable to the introduction of the pension system.
This last model draws a parallel with the Caldwell hypothesis about fertility:
the economic transition from a rural-Malthusian to a urban-Solowian economic
system affects the domestic economy; the individuals cannot ground their old-
age economic security on children (Caldwell) and land factor (Caucutt et al.),
hence, on the one hand, they choose to reduce their fertility, triggering the
demographic transition and, on the other hand, support a system which is able
to substitute the old familiar structure. Since the reduction of the overall fertility
rate affects the attractiveness of a pay-as-you-go pension system, the economic
transition has two opposite effects on it.
The purpose of the present paper is to study these two effects, in order
to evaluate their empirical relevance on the development of pension system.
It will be suggested a model which tries to evaluate the effects of the family
breakdown on the introduction of pension system, taking into account the effect
of fertility reduction. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the
model, section 3 presents the empirical results of the estimation of the model
and section 4 concludes.
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2 The basic model
2.1 The environment
In our economy agents live a maximum of two periods: at the end of the first
period, which is called middle-age, agents face a probability pi of surviving to
the second and last period of life. Moreover the economy has two locations, the
farm and the city. In the farm family ties are stronger than in the city, and this
is reflected in the amount of transfer that children award to their parents. A
proportion γ of the population lives in the farm and the others live in the city.
Individuals differ in their income (wi), which is distributed in the population
with mean w and cumulative distribution function F (·), which is positively
skewed. The objective function of a middle-aged agent living in the k ∈ (C,F )
location and having an income level wi is:
u(cik1 , c
ik
2 ) ≡ ln(cik1 ) + βpi ln(cik2 ) (1)
where cikt , t ∈ (1, 2) is the consumption of the unique good in the t-th period of
life and β is the discount factor.
In the first period each agent i receives wi units of good, upon which she
has to pay a contribution τ proportional to her income (if a pension system
is established). Moreover, she chooses how many children to have: for each
child she bears a cost of θ. The income that is not invested in children should
be consumed, otherwise it is wasted. Hence the budget constraint for the first
period is:
cik1 + θN
ik ≤ (1− τ)wi (2)
In the second period, agents receive a transfer dk from each child they had in the
first period; this transfer depends on the strength of family ties: I assume that
in the farm the transfer is higher than in the city (dF > dC). Moreover agents
receive a transfer from the social security system, which is equal to the total
amount of contributions collected from workers by the system divided by the
number of agents survived. Hence the budget constraint in the second period
is:
cik1 ≤ dkN ik +
Nτw
pi
(3)
where N is the total (or mean) fertility, hence it is given by:
N ≡ γNF + (1− γ)NC
where with Nk stands for the mean fertility in location k.
It should be noticed that as savings are not allowed, the only way in which
agents can voluntary transfer wealth from the first period to the second is by
having children. In this economy, children are perceived as investment, and this
investment is more profitable for farmers than for urban residents.
The choice of establish a social security system is taken by vote. If the system
is established, it cannot be abolished the following period. This assumption is
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necessary because if agents would expect the abolition of the pension system,
they would not vote for it, even if its approval would be optimal.
The social security system allows people to transfer wealth to their old-age,
but the amount they can transfer is chosen collectively. Therefore there are
agents who would prefer to transfer more than what is established, and they
will have children, and other agents who would like to transfer a smaller amount,
and they will not have children (actually they would like to have a “negative”
amount of children, which is obviously not possible).
2.2 Voters’ behaviour
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3), with respect to the choice variables
{cikt , N ik}t=1,2, we obtain the following three expressions:
cik1 =
θwi
dk(1 + βpi)
[
dk
θ
+ τ
(
Nw
piwi
− d
k
θ
)]
(4)
cik2 =
βpiwi
(1 + βpi)
[
dk
θ
+ τ
(
Nw
piwi
− d
k
θ
)]
(5)
N ik =
βpiwi
dk(1 + βpi)
[
dk
θ
− τ
(
Nw
βpi2wi
+
dk
θ
)]
(6)
From equation (6), we can easily see that if the pension system becomes too
large (as an extreme τ = 1), we have a corner solution, with N ik = 0. Through
some straightforward algebra, we easily obtain the threshold for each agent:
τˆ ik =
βpi d
k
θ
βpi d
k
θ +
Nw
piwi
(7)
If τ ≥ τˆ ik, then the agent will choose not have children and the consumption in
the two periods will be:
cik1 = (1− τ)wi
cik2 =
Nτw
pi
It should be noticed that for every τ◦, there exists a threshold endowment
w◦k, such that agents living in k with endowment lower than w◦k will not have
children:
w◦k =
Nθτ◦
βpi2dk(1− τ◦)w
The effect on individual fertility of an increase in τ is unambiguously non-
positive: as τ increase, the agents have a smaller available income to invest on
children, and, at the same time, they already have a larger amount of transfer
from the pension system in the second period, then they need to shift a smaller
amount of income to the old-age through children investment. In general the
effect will be negative, because N(τ) can become flat only if τ = 1, and neither
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the richest among the farmers wants to have children, but in equilibrium this
may happen only if the elderly are the majority in the population.
Moreover a migration from the farm to the city (i.e., an increase in γ) would
imply a reduction in the total fertility, hence in the profitability of the pension
system, because urban residents have a lower fertility.
2.3 Political equilibrium
In order to obtain the preferred policy by each agent, first we have to look at
how a marginal change in the policy affects the voters’ welfare:
∂V ik
∂τ
=
1 + βpi
(1− τ)dkθ + τ wN(τ)wipi
[
w
wipi
(N(τ) + τN ′τ (τ))− d
k
θ
]
(8)
A marginal increase in the rate of contribution has three effects on the voters’
indirect utility. First, an increase in the share of income compulsorily invested
in the pension system: this effect depends on the return on pension system,
which is higher for poorer voters. Second, a decrease in the return on pension
system, keeping fixed the amount of income invested in it. Third, a decrease in
the share of income invested in children: this effect depends on the return on
children, which is higher in the farm than in the city.
The sign and the size of the overall effect is different between farmers and
urban residents and between poor and rich voters: farmers have a larger negative
effect, as they have to give up a larger return from children; rich voters have a
smaller positive effect, as for them the return on pension is smaller.
We can rewrite equation (8) as follows:
∂V ik
∂τ
=
1 + βpi
(1− τ)widkwθ + τ N(τ)pi
[(
N(τ)
pi
+
τ
pi
N ′τ (τ)
)
− w
idk
wθ
]
(9)
From this equation we can easily identify a pair of farmer and urban resident
who have similar preference toward the policy rule. In fact we get:
wiF =
dC
dF
wiC (10)
For any urban resident with income wiC , there is always a farmer, with income
wiF , with the same preference toward the policy rule, and the farmer is always
poorer than his urban correspondent. Since a farmer has a higher return from
children investment, he must have a lower income (then a higher return from
pension) in order to prefer the same level of pension of an urban resident.
Since preferences are monotonic in endowment, the single crossing condition
is satisfied and a Condorcet winning tax rate does exist. To find the equilibrium
policy, we need to know which is the pair of voters (a farmer and an urban
resident) who play the median voter role. Let w∗k be the endowment of a voter
resident in k and with preferred policy τ∗; setting (9) equal to zero and solving
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for w∗k, we find that the relation between favourite policy and endowment is
given by:
w∗k =
wθ
pidk
[N (τ∗) + τ∗N ′τ (τ∗)] (11)
Let τ∗m be the equilibrium policy; in equilibrium, the number of voters who
support τ > τ∗m must be equal to the number of voters who support τ < τ∗m.
In the first coalition there will be all the elderly and the poorer among the
middle-aged voters (with a larger proportion among the urban residents, as
they are more favourable to the pension system). Using equations (10) and (11)
the equilibrium is defined by the following equation1:
(1− γ)F
(
wθ
pidC
[N(τ∗m) + τ∗mN ′τ (τ∗m)]
)
+ γF
(
wθ
pidF
[N(τ∗m) + τ∗mN ′τ (τ∗m)]
)
=
N(0)− pi
2N(0)
(12)
A higher level of urbanization has two opposite effects: it increases the weight
of urban voters, who are more willing to support the pension system, but it also
decrease the fertility, making the pension system less attractive. It is important
to notice that this second effect is not captured in a model with exogenous
fertility; therefore in this model the positive effect of the urbanization on the
probability of introduction of the pension system is dampened, and several
relation patterns between pension expenditure and urbanization may occur.
A lower family-based transfer from children in one location makes the voters
of that location more willing to substitute children with pension system, but
at the same time it reduces the total fertility, hence the number of voters who
support pensions in both locations.
A higher survival probability increases the total fertility, because agents are
willing to save more, but increases also the number of agents that will survive
to the last period. Therefore the effect on the profitability of pension system
depends on the level of the parameters. Moreover, a higher survival probability
increases the number of current old voters, thus increasing the number of voters
who support the pension system. The overall effect on the equilibrium policy is
ambiguous, and it will depend on the shape of the income distribution function.
3 Empirical findings
As the relation between strength of the family ties and pension system may
assume several patterns, an empirical evaluation of such a relation is needed.
The main conclusion of the model is that the weakening of family ties at
first promotes the introduction of pension systems, due to the reduction of the
economic support from the descendants and the need for substitution between
a familiar system and a centralized one, and then causes a reduction of the
1The number of elderly is pi
N(0)
, as in the previous period the pension system had not yet
been introduced.
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Figure 1: Possible development patterns of pension systems
political support, due to the reduction of total fertility and resulting reduction
of the profitability of the centralized system2.
3.1 Methodology
The basic specification that will be used for the regression is the linear model:
τi = β0 + β1(1− γ)i + β2(1− γ)2i + β3wi + β4Ni + β5pii + ui (13)
The idea, to sum up, is to test the coefficients β1 and β2, in order to pick up the
prevalent development pattern. On the strength of what has been said above, we
expect β2 to be negative, whereas the relation between β1 and β2 will allow us
to pick up the pattern (since (1− γ) is measured in percentage, if β1 > −200β2
the relation is monotonically increasing, if 0 < β1 < −200β2 the relation is an
inverted-U, whereas if β1 < 0 the relation is monotonically decreasing; see figure
1).
Initially, I will use the OLS method and, after an endogeneity test, I will
eventually use the IV estimator. Moreover, at first it will be shown the results
obtained using cross-sectional data, and then those obtained with panel-data.
3.2 The data set
Given the specification (13), the data set needs to include:
SSRT the dimension of pension system, measured by the ratio between contri-
butions and GDP;
2Numerical simulations, available upon request, showed three possible development pat-
terns (monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing and inverted-U), all of them con-
cave.
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Variable Description Mean St. Dev. N Min Max
SSRT Social contributions (% of
GDP)
5.49 5.31 90 0 17.94
URB Urban population (% of
the total)
62.51 21.66 90 9.16 100
OPOP Over-65 population (% of
the total)
9.34 5.19 90 1.08 18.88
GDPPC Per-capita GDP, PPP
(thousands of 2005 inter-
national dollars)
14.03 13.02 90 0.34 65.81
TFR Total fertility rate 2.37 1.3 90 0.84 6.8
CMR Child mortality rate (un-
der 5 per 1000 births)
37.14 46.38 89 3.22 186.1
SCFMRT Ratio of female to male in
the secondary school en-
rollment
99.58 12.68 87 42.6 121.3
GINI Gini index 39.08 9.43 66 25 60.05
TAXAT Tax revenue (% of GDP) 16.28 6.3 90 0.96 29.53
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (2002 cross-section)
URB the urban rate, that is the ratio of urban to total population;
GDPPC the per-capita GDP based on PPP;
TFR the total fertility rate, that is the average number of children per woman;
OPOP the size of old-age population, measured by the ratio of over-65 to total
population.
Moreover I will use some control variables, the Gini index (GINI), as a measure
of income heterogeneity, and the fiscal incidence (TAXAT), measured by the
ratio of fiscal contributions to GDP.
For the endogeneity test and the IV regressions other two variables will be
used: the child (under the age of five) mortality rate (CMR) and the female
education level, measured by the ratio of female to male secondary enrollment
(SCFMRT). Thus, I consider such variables relevant in explaining the fertility
rate (because of the “hoarding” effect and the Caldwell hypothesis about social
policy and fertility cost), but exogenous with respect to the estimated model.
The data used are those provided by the World Bank3. Since we need a
data set which include the largest possible number of countries, we can perform
two type of analysis: either a cross-sectional one on 2002 data (the year with
the highest number of observations) and, if not available, on the closest ones, or
a panel one on five-year average data between 1990 and 2005, which will have
3World Bank, World Development Indicators April 2008, ESDS International, University
of Manchester
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Variable A B C D B2 B2-IV
URB 0.1053∗∗ 0.1753∗∗∗ 0.0948∗∗ 0.1733∗∗∗ 0.1778∗∗∗ 0.1514∗∗
(2.385) (2.867) (2.103) (2.881) (2.935) (2.499)
URBSQ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0013∗∗ -0.0011∗
(-2.583) (-2.504) (-2.444) (-2.569) (-2.49) (-1.969)
OPOP 0.8485∗∗∗ 0.7632∗∗∗ 0.8837∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.7946∗∗∗ 0.6926∗∗∗
(9.577) (6.685) (9.725) (6.658) (7.592) (6.144)
GDPPC 0.055∗ 0.0242 0.0598∗∗ 0.0126
(1.981) (0.833) (2.134) (0.422)
TFR 0.2674 0.5195∗ 0.2918 0.4834∗ 0.5807∗∗ 0.1054
(0.97) (1.966) (1.068) (1.85) (2.149) (0.331)
GINI -0.1222∗∗∗ -0.1181∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.1331∗∗∗
(-3.017) (-2.909) (-3.101) (-3.192)
TAXAT -0.0593 0.081
(-0.894) (1.121)
Constant -5.4967∗∗∗ -3.3746 -4.6515∗∗ -4.3179∗ -3.5276 -0.8212
(-3.231) (-1.475) (-2.244) (-1.941) (-1.556) (-0.322)
URBMAX 46.707 63.902 45.004 63.200 66.749 70.513
(5.455) (7.914) (6.853) (7.601) (8.817) (12.065)
N 90 66 90 66 66 65
AIC 448.694 309.96 449.427 310.121 308.593
BIC 463.693 325.288 466.925 327.639 321.731
R2 0.732 0.804 0.735 0.809 0.802 0.806
∗ 10% significant; ∗∗ 5% significant; ∗∗∗ 1% significant
Standard errors are Huber-White corrected
T-statistics in parentheses for the estimated coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses for the estimated URBMAX
Table 2: Cross-section estimates
a limited validity because of the smaller number of observations per country.
Using the cross-sectional data we can analyze up to 90 countries (except when we
will include the Gini index in the regression, reducing the number of observations
to 66).
3.3 Estimates
Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis. The model A is the basis one,
represented by equation (13), whereas the others add more control variables. It
is important to notice that the B and D estimations include a smaller number
of countries, because of the fewer observations of the Gini index, therefore the
results are not perfectly comparable.
The first important result is the important role played by the share of elderly:
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this result is quite predictable, both from a political viewpoint (elderly get a
stronger political power) and from an economic one (a higher number of elderly
requires a bigger pension system). The estimated coefficients imply that a 1%
increase in the old-age share of the population induces a 0.8% increase in the
ratio between social contributions and GDP.
The URB and URBSQ estimated coefficients support the concavity of the
relation, and in particular the inverted-U pattern: for low levels of the urban-
ization rate, as it increases the pension system expands, but for higher levels of
urbanization the relation is inverted. URBMAX is the estimated maximum of
the relation. The considerable difference between the models including the Gini
index or not may be ascribed to the reduction of the observed countries, hence
to a different distribution of the URB variable.
The per-capita income level seems to have a small positive effect on the
dimension of pension system, as claimed by the Wagner law. However, such
effect is rather limited, and it is not significant when the Gini index is taken
into account.
The Gini index is significant, but the sign of the estimated coefficient is
negative, which seems to contradict the hypothesis that a higher income hetero-
geneity leads to bigger pension system, due to the demand of income redistri-
bution policies. The negative relation, instead, seems to catch the effect of the
welfare state level of development: in countries where higher is the development
of welfare state, the Gini index is lower as outcome of the income redistribution
policies. Moreover, when the Gini index enter the equation, it makes the per-
capita income not significant, absorbing its role of measure of the socioeconomic
development. The B2 model does not take into account the per-capita income
variable, and the results are not significantly different from the B model.
The fiscal incidence is never significant in explaining the size of pension
systems: this in part contradicts the Leviathan theory about the tendency of
governments to expand as much as possible the scope of their authority.
For the B2 model, I performed an endogeneity Hausman test on fertility,
using the child mortality rate and the ratio of female to male in the secondary
school enrollment, and the null hypothesis of exogeneity was rejected. Then
I estimated the B2 model, using the IV estimator, and the results are shown
in the last column of table 2. In the first stage, the two instruments resulted
highly significant and the F-statistic was equal to 64.82. The null hypotheses of
the J-test and the Sargan test about the exogeneity of the instruments were not
rejected (respectively with 0.513 and 0.582 p-value). The estimated coefficients
results quite similar to those obtained with the OLS estimator, and URBMAX
becomes higher, but not significantly.
In conclusion, all the estimates support the inverted-U pattern of develop-
ment. However the models provide noticeably different estimates of the max-
imum of such curve, in particular when the Gini index is taken into account
(probably because of the smaller number of observations and the consequent
different distribution of URB). The best estimates seem to be the A, because of
the higher number of observations, and the B2-IV, because it takes into account
also the Gini index and seems to be more precise. Both models suggest that
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Variable A B C B2 A-IV A2-IV
URB 0.1623∗∗∗ 0.1428∗∗∗ 0.1585∗∗∗ 0.1407∗∗∗ 0.1494∗∗ 0.1434∗∗
(3.423) (3.036) (3.397) (2.933) (2.316) (2.247)
URBSQ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.0013∗∗ -0.0012∗∗
(-3.227) (-2.396) (-3.189) (-2.139) (-2.351) (-2.316)
OPOP 0.4864∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.4796∗∗∗ 0.4995∗∗∗ 0.5768∗∗∗ 0.6046∗∗∗
(5.214) (3.298) (4.962) (4.512) (6.258) (7.474)
GDPPC 0.0263 0.0566 0.0236 0.0244
(0.905) (1.107) (0.881) (0.773)
TFR -0.2317∗ -0.1158 -0.2435∗ -0.0598 -0.0772 -0.1208
(-1.797) (-0.758) (-1.89) (-0.363) (-0.205) (-0.32)
GINI -0.111∗∗∗ -0.1184∗∗∗
(-3.439) (-3.292)
TAXAT 0.038
(1.051)
Constant -2.4842∗∗ 1.8052 -2.9188∗∗ 1.7376 -3.6474 -3.4024
(-2.124) (0.936) (-2.449) (0.875) (-1.299) (-1.208)
URBMAX 55.275 64.220 55.411 69.261 57.830 58.741
(4.714) (9.358) (4.847) (12.731) (7.827) (7.391)
N 226 130 226 131 182 186
Ng 99 75 99 76 95 98
g 2.283 1.733 2.283 1.724 1.916 1.898
R2 0.706 0.707 0.7 0.701 0.723 0.72
∗ 10% significant; ∗∗ 5% significant; ∗∗∗ 1% significant
Standard errors are cluster corrected
T-statistics in parentheses for the estimated coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses for the estimated URBMAX
Table 3: Panel estimates
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over a certain level of urbanization, between 50 and 70%, the pension systems
tend to become smaller.
Table 3 shows the results of the panel analysis: the specification are analo-
gous to those of table 2, and are estimated with random effects.
The pattern supported by all the estimates is still the inverted-U one. The
maximum of the relation, again, depends on whether the Gini index is included
in the regression or not.
Both the per-capita income and the fiscal incidence are not significant,
whereas the Gini index is highly significant and, again, seems to have a negative
influence on the dimension of pension systems.
The fertility rate results significant only for the specifications which do not
include the Gini index. In this case the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis
of exogeneity, hence I used IV, and the results are shown in last two columns.
The main difference concerns the coefficient on old-age population, whereas the
maximum of the relation between pension system and urban population holds
essentially steady at 58%.
4 Conclusions
Part of the economic literature, and particularly the Caldwell hypothesis, ex-
plain the reduction of fertility with the evolution of the social structures and the
transition from a rural economy, in which the children were a source of wealth,
to a urban and westernized economy, in which children subtract resources from
the domestic economy.
The smaller ascendant intergenerational transfer causes the need for a social
policy able to maintain old-age consumption, stimulating the introduction of
pension systems and their expansion.
The theoretical model presented in section 2 analyzes the net effect of the
weakening of family ties on the dimension of pension system, taking into account
the reduction of fertility and, therefore, the reduction of the rate of return of
pay-as-you-go pension systems. The relation between the strength of family
ties and the dimension of pension system may assume several shapes, either
monotonic or not, but presumably concave.
The empirical analysis, shown in section 3, support an inverted-U devel-
opment pattern: a continuous and progressive weakening of family ties, after
inducing the introduction of pension systems, tends to reduce, ceteris paribus,
their political support.
The reduction of political support toward social security systems, caused by
the reduction of the fertility rate, is partially offset by the progressive ageing
of the population which, on the one hand, reduces as well the profitability of
pension system, but on the other hand increases the political weight of old-
age voters: the overall effect of the ageing of the population is positive, as
acknowledged by the previous literature in the field.
However, if fertility rates continue their rapid decline, as in the past years,
pay-as-you-go pension systems may not be sufficiently profitable for them to be
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supported by the majority of the voters, hence being destined to disappear or
replaced by the funded ones.
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